Zero-Knowledge Password Policy Check from Lattices

Passwords are ubiquitous and most commonly used to authenticate users when logging into online services. Using high entropy passwords is critical to prevent unauthorized access and password policies emerged to enforce this requirement on passwords. However, with current methods of password storage, poor practices and server breaches have leaked many passwords to the public. To protect one's sensitive information in case of such events, passwords should be hidden from servers. Verifier-based password authenticated key exchange, proposed by Bellovin and Merrit (IEEE S\&P, 1992), allows authenticated secure channels to be established with a hash of a password (verifier). Unfortunately, this restricts password policies as passwords cannot be checked from their verifier. To address this issue, Kiefer and Manulis (ESORICS 2014) proposed zero-knowledge password policy check (ZKPPC). A ZKPPC protocol allows users to prove in zero knowledge that a hash of the user's password satisfies the password policy required by the server. Unfortunately, their proposal is not quantum resistant with the use of discrete logarithm-based cryptographic tools and there are currently no other viable alternatives. In this work, we construct the first post-quantum ZKPPC using lattice-based tools. To this end, we introduce a new randomised password hashing scheme for ASCII-based passwords and design an accompanying zero-knowledge protocol for policy compliance. Interestingly, our proposal does not follow the framework established by Kiefer and Manulis and offers an alternate construction without homomorphic commitments. Although our protocol is not ready to be used in practice, we think it is an important first step towards a quantum-resistant privacy-preserving password-based authentication and key exchange system

Achieving GWAS with Homomorphic Encryption

One way of investigating how genes affect human traits would be with a genome-wide association study (GWAS). Genetic markers, known as single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP), are used in GWAS. This raises privacy and security concerns as these genetic markers can be used to identify individuals uniquely. This problem is further exacerbated by a large number of SNPs needed, which produce reliable results at a higher risk of compromising the privacy of participants. We describe a method using homomorphic encryption (HE) to perform GWAS in a secure and private setting. This work is based on a proposed algorithm. Our solution mainly involves homomorphically encrypted matrix operations and suitable approximations that adapts the semi-parallel GWAS algorithm for HE. We leverage the complex space of the CKKS encryption scheme to increase the number of SNPs that can be packed within a ciphertext. We have also developed a cache module that manages ciphertexts, reducing the memory footprint. We have implemented our solution over two HE open source libraries, HEAAN and SEAL. Our best implementation took $24.70$ minutes for a dataset with $245$ samples, over $4$ covariates and $10643$ SNPs. We demonstrate that it is possible to achieve GWAS with homomorphic encryption with suitable approximations

Towards the AlexNet Moment for Homomorphic Encryption: HCNN, theFirst Homomorphic CNN on Encrypted Data with GPUs

Deep Learning as a Service (DLaaS) stands as a promising solution for cloud-based inference applications. In this setting, the cloud has a pre-learned model whereas the user has samples on which she wants to run the model. The biggest concern with DLaaS is user privacy if the input samples are sensitive data. We provide here an efficient privacy-preserving system by employing high-end technologies such as Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE), Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) and Graphics Processing Units (GPUs). FHE, with its widely-known feature of computing on encrypted data, empowers a wide range of privacy-concerned applications. This comes at high cost as it requires enormous computing power. In this paper, we show how to accelerate the performance of running CNNs on encrypted data with GPUs. We evaluated two CNNs to classify homomorphically the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets. Our solution achieved a sufficient security level (> 80 bit) and reasonable classification accuracy (99%) and (77.55%) for MNIST and CIFAR-10, respectively. In terms of latency, we could classify an image in 5.16 seconds and 304.43 seconds for MNIST and CIFAR-10, respectively. Our system can also classify a batch of images (> 8,000) without extra overhead

Better Security for Queries on Encrypted Databases

Private database query (PDQ) processing has received much attention from the fields of both cryptography and databases. While previous approaches to design PDQ protocols exploit several cryptographic tools concurrently, recently the appearance of fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes enables us to design PDQ protocols without the aid of additional tools. However, to the best of our knowledge, all currently existing FHE-based PDQ protocols focus on protecting only constants in query statements, together with the client\u27s data stored in the database server. In this paper, we provide a FHE-based PDQ protocol achieving better security, protecting query types as well as constants in query statements for conjunctive, disjunctive, and threshold queries with equality comparison. Our contributions are three-fold: First, we present a new security definition that reflects our enhanced security model which additionally protects query types in query statements. Second, we provide a new design for PDQ protocols using FHE schemes. To do this, we come up with a method to homomorphically evaluate our encrypted target queries on the encrypted database. Thereafter, we apply it to construct a protocol and show its security under our enhanced security definition in the semi-honest model. Finally, we provide proof-of-concept implementation results of our PDQ protocol. According to our rudimentary experiments, it takes 40 seconds to perform a query on 2352 elements consisting of 11 attributes of 40-bit using Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan\u27s leveled FHE with SIMD techniques for 80-bit security, yielding an amortized rate of just 0.12 seconds per element

Efficient Private Comparison Queries over Encrypted Databases using Fully Homomorphic Encryption with Finite Fields

To achieve security and privacy for data stored on the cloud, we need the ability to secure data in compute. Equality comparisons, ``$x=y, x\neq y$\u27\u27, have been widely studied with many proposals but there is much room for improvement for order comparisons, ``$x y$ and $x \geq y$\u27\u27. Most protocols for order comparisons have some limitation, either leaking some information about the data or requiring several rounds of communication between client and server. In addition, little work has been done on retrieving with compound conditions, mixing several equality and order comparisons. Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) promises the ability to compute arbitrary functions on encrypted data without sacrificing privacy and without communication, but its potential has yet to be fulfilled. Particularly, private comparisons for database queries using FHE are expensive to compute. In this work, we design efficient private database query (PDQ) protocols which support order comparisons and compound conditions. To this end, we first present a private comparison algorithm on encrypted integers using FHE, which scales efficiently for the length of input integers, by applying techniques from finite field theory. Then, we consider two scenarios for PDQ protocols, the first for retrieving data based on one order comparison and the second based on a conjunction of one order and four equality conditions. The proposed algorithm and protocols are implemented and tested to determine their performance in practice. The proposed comparison algorithm takes about 20.155 seconds to compare 697 pairs of 64-bit integers using Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan\u27s leveled FHE scheme with single instruction multiple data (SIMD) techniques at more than 110 bits of security. This yields an amortized rate of just 29 milliseconds per comparison. On top of that, we show that our techniques achieve an efficient PDQ protocol for one order and four equality comparisons, achieving an amortized time and communication cost of 36 milliseconds and 154 bytes per database element

Field Instruction Multiple Data

Fully homomorphic encryption~(FHE) has flourished since it was first constructed by Gentry~(STOC 2009). Single instruction multiple data~(SIMD) gave rise to efficient homomorphic operations on vectors in $(\mathbb{F}_{t^d})^\ell$, for prime $t$. RLWE instantiated with cyclotomic polynomials of the form $X^{2^N}+1$ dominate implementations of FHE due to highly efficient fast Fourier transformations. However, this choice yields very short SIMD plaintext vectors and high degree extension fields, e.g. $\ell 100$ for small primes~($t = 3, 5, \dots$). In this work, we describe a method to encode more data on top of SIMD, \emph{Field Instruction Multiple Data}, applying reverse multiplication friendly embedding~(RMFE) to FHE. With RMFE, length-$k$ $\mathbb{F}_{t}$ vectors can be encoded into $\mathbb{F}_{t^d}$ and multiplied once. The results have to be recoded~(decoded and then re-encoded) before further multiplications can be done. We introduce an FHE-specific technique to additionally evaluate arbitrary linear transformations on encoded vectors for free during the FHE recode operation. On top of that, we present two optimizations to unlock high degree extension fields with small $t$ for homomorphic computation: $r$-fold RMFE, which allows products of up to $2^r$ encoded vectors before recoding, and a three-stage recode process for RMFEs obtained by composing two smaller RMFEs. Experiments were performed to evaluate the effectiveness of FIMD from various RMFEs compared to standard SIMD operations. Overall, we found that FIMD generally had $>2\times$ better (amortized) multiplication times compared to FHE for the same amount of data, while using almost $k/2 \times$ fewer ciphertexts required

Observation of associated near-side and away-side long-range correlations in √sNN=5.02 TeV proton-lead collisions with the ATLAS detector

Two-particle correlations in relative azimuthal angle (Δϕ) and pseudorapidity (Δη) are measured in √sNN=5.02  TeV p+Pb collisions using the ATLAS detector at the LHC. The measurements are performed using approximately 1  μb-1 of data as a function of transverse momentum (pT) and the transverse energy (ΣETPb) summed over 3.1<η<4.9 in the direction of the Pb beam. The correlation function, constructed from charged particles, exhibits a long-range (2<|Δη|<5) “near-side” (Δϕ∼0) correlation that grows rapidly with increasing ΣETPb. A long-range “away-side” (Δϕ∼π) correlation, obtained by subtracting the expected contributions from recoiling dijets and other sources estimated using events with small ΣETPb, is found to match the near-side correlation in magnitude, shape (in Δη and Δϕ) and ΣETPb dependence. The resultant Δϕ correlation is approximately symmetric about π/2, and is consistent with a dominant cos⁡2Δϕ modulation for all ΣETPb ranges and particle pT

Search for R-parity-violating supersymmetry in events with four or more leptons in sqrt(s) =7 TeV pp collisions with the ATLAS detector

A search for new phenomena in final states with four or more leptons (electrons or muons) is presented. The analysis is based on 4.7 fb−1 of $\sqrt{s}=7\;\mathrm{TeV}$ proton-proton collisions delivered by the Large Hadron Collider and recorded with the ATLAS detector. Observations are consistent with Standard Model expectations in two signal regions: one that requires moderate values of missing transverse momentum and another that requires large effective mass. The results are interpreted in a simplified model of R-parity-violating supersymmetry in which a 95% CL exclusion region is set for charged wino masses up to 540 GeV. In an R-parity-violating MSUGRA/CMSSM model, values of m 1/2 up to 820 GeV are excluded for 10 < tan β < 40

Search for high-mass resonances decaying to dilepton final states in pp collisions at s√=7 TeV with the ATLAS detector

The ATLAS detector at the Large Hadron Collider is used to search for high-mass resonances decaying to an electron-positron pair or a muon-antimuon pair. The search is sensitive to heavy neutral Z′ gauge bosons, Randall-Sundrum gravitons, Z * bosons, techni-mesons, Kaluza-Klein Z/γ bosons, and bosons predicted by Torsion models. Results are presented based on an analysis of pp collisions at a center-of-mass energy of 7 TeV corresponding to an integrated luminosity of 4.9 fb−1 in the e + e − channel and 5.0 fb−1 in the μ + μ −channel. A Z ′ boson with Standard Model-like couplings is excluded at 95 % confidence level for masses below 2.22 TeV. A Randall-Sundrum graviton with coupling k/MPl=0.1 is excluded at 95 % confidence level for masses below 2.16 TeV. Limits on the other models are also presented, including Technicolor and Minimal Z′ Models

Measurement of the flavour composition of dijet events in pp collisions at root s=7 TeV with the ATLAS detector

This paper describes a measurement of the flavour composition of dijet events produced in pp collisions at &#8730;s=7 TeV using the ATLAS detector. The measurement uses the full 2010 data sample, corresponding to an integrated luminosity of 39 pb−1. Six possible combinations of light, charm and bottom jets are identified in the dijet events, where the jet flavour is defined by the presence of bottom, charm or solely light flavour hadrons in the jet. Kinematic variables, based on the properties of displaced decay vertices and optimised for jet flavour identification, are used in a multidimensional template fit to measure the fractions of these dijet flavour states as functions of the leading jet transverse momentum in the range 40 GeV to 500 GeV and jet rapidity |y|&#60;2.1. The fit results agree with the predictions of leading- and next-to-leading-order calculations, with the exception of the dijet fraction composed of bottom and light flavour jets, which is underestimated by all models at large transverse jet momenta. The ability to identify jets containing two b-hadrons, originating from e.g. gluon splitting, is demonstrated. The difference between bottom jet production rates in leading and subleading jets is consistent with the next-to-leading-order predictions